War Party in a Bind: After Nuclear Talks in Geneva, Iran Will Likely ...

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The meeting in Geneva on July 19, between representatives of the5+1 (U.N. Security Council permanent members plus Germany) andIran, should be heartily welcomed by all those who seek adiplomatic solution to the hoked-up case against the IslamicRepublic's nuclear energy program, and, thus, an end to the threatof a new war in the region. Although, as both sides stressed, nofinal agreement was struck at the talks, the fact that they tookplace at all was significant. The presence in Geneva, ofUndersecretary of State William Burns, signalled the first timethat the U.S. has officially met with the Iranians since the 1979revolution, if one excludes the multilateral gatherings onAfghanistan and on Iraq. It is highly likely that the Geneva talkswill lead to agreement between the West and Iran.
Yet, the spin in the establishment press on the event, has beenmost unhelpful, often bordering on sabotage. One line had it that,since the Iranians did not immediately bow down and lisp, "Yes,sir," to the call for a freeze on its uranium enrichmentactivities, they were rejecting the 5+1's bargaining position toutcourt. Others claimed Tehran were only stalling, in hopes ofaverting any military aggression until the U.S. elections inNovember. Still others seized on reports of Iranian militarymaneuvers, conducted prior to the talks, as "proof" of Tehran'scommitment to develop nuclear weapons to destroy Israel. Regionalmilitary maneuvres by Iran, which came on the heels of Israeliexercises simulating attacks on the Islamic Republic, featured thefiring of 9 middle-range missiles. In response, Secretary of StateCondi Rice issued usual complaints, and both presumptivePresidential candidates John McCain and Barack Obama reiteratedthat Iran is "a threat."
Nonetheless, the talks in Geneva did take place, and should betaken as grounds for optimism -- cautious, to be sure -- butoptimism. There are several reasons for this. First, the decisionto accept negotiations on the basis of the 5+1 proposal deliveredin Iran by Javier Solana on June 14, was taken at the highest levelof policy-making in Tehran, i.e. by Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei,Supreme Leader of the Revolution. All the leading Iranian spokesmenwho signalled assent to the proposal, are answerable to Khamenei.These include Saeed Jalili, head of the Supreme National SecurityCouncil, and, in that capacity, chief negotiator on nuclearquestions; Gholam-Reza Aghezadeh, head of the Iranian Atomic EnergyAgency, who on June 30 told a parliamentary committee the decisionfor talks had been made; Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki; and,foreign policy advisor to Khamenei, Ali Akhbar Velayati.
As if to eliminate any doubts on the matter, Khamenei himselfexplicitly endorsed the talks. As reported on his official website, www.Khamenei.ir on July 16, the Supreme Leader stated: "The negotiations willproceed successfully only when the atmosphere of the negotiaitonsis not dominated by threats. Europeans have to pay attention to thepoint that it is the Iranian nation that they are negotiating with.The Iranian nation is a valiant nation that does not like threats,and is not going to give in to any threats." Khamenei alsoexpressed his full confidence in the bodies dealing with the issue,the Supreme National Security Council which "is in charge of thenuclear issue and is presided over by the esteemed president.Whatever the president and the officials in charge of the nuclearissue say is also approved by all the government officials. And theheads of the three government branches and my representatives arepursuing this issue in the Supreme National Security Council withwisdom and commitment." The top official said "the red lines of theIranian nation are absolutely clear," and will not be crossed. Thiswas a reference to demands that Iran suspend its enrichment programcompletely, in essence, giving it up entirely.
A second reason for optimism, is that, on the other side, a "newatmosphere" had been created, which helped leading Iranian figuresto overcome their skepticism. In remarks to CNN on July 7, Mottakinoted the new atmosphere, saying, "We believe that the nature ofour exchanges, both in format and in substance, were different thanof previous times." He went on, "So I believe that we are now in anew environment with a new approaching perspective..." Mottaki alsoreferred to the upcoming elections in the U.S., as a possiblemoment of transition. "We hear new voices in America," he said, "Wesee new approaches, and we think that the rational thinkers inAmerica can, based on these new approaches, see the reality as itis."
Mottaki was upbeat about the new atmosphere, also because Solanahad acknowledged the importance of Iran on the world stage. On June15, Tehran Times quoted the Eu foreign policy czar as saying the5+1 "fully recognize Iran's right to nuclear energy for peacefulpurposes," adding, "We want to have a fully normalized relationshipin all fields, in particular the nuclear field." He said Iran was"a very important and civilized country which plays a veryimportant role in the international arena."
The meeting in Geneva lasted several hours on July 19. As noted, noconcrete breakthrough agreement occurred. According to reports, the5+1 group formally presented the "freeze-for-freeze" proposal thatSolana had offered earlier in oral form to the Iranians, and theIranians declined to give an immediate, formal answer. Thus theskepticism and the press spin. Iran reportedly delivered a two-page"non-paper" to the 5+1, whose contents have not been made public.The New York Times on July 22 leaked parts of the non-paper,according to which Tehran requested three further meetings withSolana and four meetings at the foriegn ministers' level, beginningafter a halt in sanctions against Iran.
In Geneva, the 5+1 gave Iran two weeks' time to formulate a finalresponse to their offer. This was followed by a public statement bySecretary of State Condi Rice, who complained that Iran was"meandering" and engaging in "small talk," and added that eitherIran must accept, "or face growing isolation and the collectiveresponse of not just one nation but of all nations around theworld." Furthermore, new military manuevres were announced. TheU.S., France, Britain and Brazil were to start 10-day exercises offthe coast from Virginia to Florida, "aimed at training foroperation in shallow coastal waters such as the Persian Gulf andthe Strait of Hormuz," according to PressTV(www.payvand.com/news/08/jul/1216.html).
All that notwithstanding, the fact is, a high-level U.S. diplomat,William Burns, took part in the talks. This was a crucial victoryfor the Iranians, who have been demanding direct contact withoutpreconditions. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was most unusuallyexplicit in his praise for the U.S. gesture. Speaking on July 23 toa gathering in Yasouj city in southwestern Iran, he stated: "TheU.S. administration announced it was going to participate innuclear talks. We welcomed that. The U.S. representative spoke in agentlemanly tone in the meeting. It was positive." According to anAP wire on July 23, Ahmadinejad said Burns's presence "was a steptowards recognizing the rights of the Iranian nation, towardsjustice, towards repairing your image in the world, towardscleaning 50 years of crimes you committed against the Iraniannation." Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki had also characterizedthe announcement that Burns would participate, as "a positivedevelopment."
In the view of Iranian sources, the presence of Burns signalled avictory (at least temporary) of the anti-war forces in Washington,over the Cheney-led war party. Reports from Washington have it thatCondi Rice dispatched Burns, over the objections of the vicepresident. Rice's move was a political gesture which was generated,however, by a concerted action on the part of the top brass in theU.S. military establishment. Chairman of the Joint Chief of StaffMullen had been to Israel where he was presumably briefed on theIsraeli hawks' blueprint for military attacks against Iran. Wihoutrevealing the details of his discussions, Muller made clear that hewould not rubber stamp any such insane designs. After his talks, hesaid that opening a third front in the region was out of thequestion.
Why Did Iran Go To Geneva?
The block to direct talks had been the insistence, on the part ofthe 5+1, that Iran {suspend} its uranium enrichment as aprecondition, which Tehran had consistently refused. Now, althoughthe {written} letter of the 5+1 countries' foreign ministers,accompanying their proposal, still explicitly said, "Formalnegotiations can start as soon as Iran's enrichment-related andreprocessing activities are suspended," Solana did make an {oral}offer to start talks, once Iran had agreed to a "freeze" on itsenrichment activities, at least for the duration of thenegotiations (SeeTrita Parsi, "Reading Solana in Tehran,"www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=43097 and www.tritaparsi.com). Thisidea of a freeze, meaning Iran would continue to enrich but atcurrent levels, had been discussed informally in the Iranian press,and in most concrete terms by two prominent Iranians at aconference in Berlin at the end of June (See my article, "IraniansFloat An Offer the West Should Not Refuse," globalresearch.ca June19). The virtue of the freeze approach lies in the fact that itallows both sides to save face: Iran does not submit to demands tosuspend (i.e. halt, even temporarily) its enrichment, but the otherside can argue that Iran is not expanding its program.
Much has been written about Tehran's motives for accepting thetalks. Some claim Iran was reacting to threats of militaryaggression by the U.S. and/or Israel. But this hypothesis, as TritaParsi has elaborated, does not hold water; were Iran to respondthis way to threats, it would have done so much earlier, when thethreats were even more direct. More credible is the argument, thatIran found the moment propitious, because the other side appearedto accept, at least in part, its terms. First and foremost is theidea of the freeze, rather than suspension. Secondly, the 5+1, atleast in the person of Solana, displayed a new quality of respectregarding Iran. This factor, which many dismiss as irrelevant, isof utmost concern to the Iranians, as should be obvious inKhamenei's remarks cited above.
Find Points of Agreement
In the run-up to the talks, Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki saidthey should begin on the basis of the "common points" in theproposals made by the two sides: the 5+1 proposal presented on June14 by Solana, and Iran's earlier "Package for ConstructiveNegotiations," sent out on May 13. In other words, instead ofrejecting the proposal because it contained demands unacceptable toIran, the Iranian leadership decided to pursue a different method,putting unacceptable demands on the back burner for the moment, andfocussing on what the two had in common.
The common points are many. Although they have not been given thein-depth analysis they deserve in the international press, at leastRussia has taken note. Nicholas Patrochev, the new Secretary of theRussian Security Council, in a phone discussions with his Iraniancounterpart Jalili on July 7, said Russia supported the conceptthat talks should be resumed on the basis of the common points.
Mottaki had stated in his letter accompanying Iran's May 13proposal, that Iran was "ready to negotiate with the 5+1 Groupwithin a specific framework on issues of mutual interest." Theproposal itself stressed that "The main outcome of this new roundof negotiations would be agreement on 'collective commitments' tocooperate on economic, political, regional, international, nuclearand energy security issues." All these areas are covered by the 5+1proposal.
In its detailed points, the Iranian proposal stressed the need topursue "a just peace and democracy in the region" in the context of"Respect for the rights of nations and their national interests;Support for the national sovereignty of states based on democraticmethods." Iran also expressed its readiness to cooperate onbolstering stability in various parts of the world, including theMiddle East, where it would contribute to a solution to thePalestinian-Israeli conflict. The 5+1 proposal seems to take thisinto consideration, when it says it would "Support Iran in playingan important and constructive role in international affairs." The5+1 Group also gives a nod to respect for national sovereignty, bystating, "Reaffirmation of the obligation under the U.N. charter torefrain in their international relations from the threat or use offorce against the territorial integrity of [sic] politicalindependence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent withthe Charter of the United Nations." This seems to mark a bit of animprovement over the 2006 document by the same group, whichreportedly "guaranteed" Iran that no power in Europe would attackit with nuclear weapons (that is, France or Britain), but made nomention of the U.S. or Israel; nor did it guarantee thatconventional attacks would be excluded.
This clause leads to another of Iran's major concerns, i.e.establishing regional security. The entire thrust of Tehran'sdocument, is that national sovereignty, territorial integrity, andindependence must be guaranteed, which means, threats of militaryaggression or regime change must be trashed from the agenda. The5+1 document lists "Support for a conference on regional securityissues" under its political measures. This is interesting. Iran hasbeen organizing for a regional security arrangement, in talks withits neighbors, for the past eight years at least, and has made someheadway with Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq and Turkey. Iran's view isthat regional security can only be guaranteed through cooperationamong its constituent nations, emphatically without the presence offoreign troops, no matter from where.
This obviously flies in the face of U.S.-U.K. plans to maintaintheir military presence in the region. The ongoing tug-of-warbetween the Nouri al-Maliki government in Iraq and the U.S.,regarding a Status of Forces Agreement, provides a good reflectionof Iranian views on the matter. All Iran-allied forces in Iraqreject the U.S. proposal for long-term presence. Not only hasal-Maliki demanded a timetable for withdrawal of foreign troops,but his Iraqi National Security Advisor Muwafaq al-Rubaie has alsosaid occupation must end. As quoted by Xinhua on July 9, al-Rubaiestated, "We will not sign any memorandum of understanding withoutspecifying a date for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iraq."Significantly, he made the statements from the holy city of Najaf,just after he had concluded consultations with the supremeauthority for Shi'ites, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Al-Sistanihas reiterated that any agreement on military forces with theoccupying powers must be subjected to a referendum. Since then, theU.S. has been forced to pay lip service to agreement on reduction,if not withdrawal, of forces. On July 18, after Bush and al-Malikihad conferred on the matter, the White House made an announcementin language straddling a fine line between Orwellian Newspeak andBushspeak, to the effect that somehow some agreement had been made."The president and the prime minister agreed," it said, "thatimproving conditions should allow for the agreements now undernegotiation to include a general time horizon for meetingaspirational goals -- such as the resumption of Iraqi securitycontrol in their cities and provinces and the further reduction ofU.S. combat forces from Iraq."(1)
Iran's document also calls for discussions on cooperation on tradeand investment, something that is echoed in the 5+1 paper, whichcalls for "normalization of trade and economic relations." Thecentral issue, of course, is the nuclear program. Here, there arealso several areas of tangential convergence, though not agreement.Iran speaks of "Establishing enrichment and nuclear fuel productionconsortiums in different parts of the world -- including Iran" andof "Cooperation to access and utilize peaceful nuclear technologyand facilitating its usage by all states." The 5+1 document doesnot grant Iran the right to such a consortium on its territory, butspeaks of "Provision of legally binding nuclear fuel supplyguarantees" as well as "Cooperation with regard to management ofspent fuel and radioactive waste." Sorting out the differences isthe task of negotiations.
What is useful in the 5+1 paper is the "Support for construction ofLWR (Light water reactor) based on state-of-the-art technology" aswell as "Provision of technological and financial assistancenecessary for Iran's peaceful use of nuclear energy, support forthe reusmption of technical cooperation projects in Iran by theIAEA." Also useful, and in agreement with Iran's approach, is thereference to "realizing the objective of a Middle East free ofweapons of mass destruction," which would have implications forIsrael, the one nuclear power in the region.
If one were to proceed rationally in open-ended talks, severaloptions might be available. To accomodate Iran's requirements forguaranteed nuclear fuel supplies, preferably through theestablishment of international consortia for enrichment facilitiesin Iran and elsewhere, the proposals by Thomas Pickering, the MITgroup, the International Crisis Group, and others could berelevant. For Iran to agree to suspend its enrichment program, aproposition which is seen by most Iranians as highly unlikely, theother side would have to go a very, very long way. It would have toprovide air-tight guarantees not only for secure fuel supplies, butalso for the security of Iran, the inviolability of its borders,respect for its independence and unlimited sovereignty. Suchguarantees cannot be made on paper, but would have to be forgedthrough political agreements amounting to endorsement of a regionalsecurity arrangement hammered out by the powers in the region,without outside interference. This may seem unthinkable at themoment, but, if the trend towards sovereignty underway in Iraq isallowed to continue, and if certain Arab nations in the PersianGulf were to free themselves of their paranoia regarding Iran, thecurrently unthinkable might become an agenda item tomorrow.
Obviously, the success of talks with Iran depends on the positionof the U.S. government. If Washington, under new leadership, wereto agree to normalizing relations with Iran, anything would bepossible.
War Party in a Bind
The war party in London and Washington has not given up its plansfor destabilizing or attacking Iran, before the Bush-Cheney mandateends. More killings inside Iran were reported in late June-earlyJuly, substantiating Seymour Hersh's revelations of an activeoperation afoot by U.S. intelligence groups, to promote ethnicminorities in assassination operations against Iranian officials.At the same time, the anti-Iranian terrorist gang MKO had beenreactivated, with a mass demonstration called near Paris weeks ago.The umbrella group of the MKO, run by Maryam Rajavi, called for allEuropean governments to follow the lead of the British House ofLords, who voted to take the MKO off the list of terroristorganizations. The al-Maliki government in Iraq has promised itwould expel the MKO, as requested by Iran, but the occupying powershave held up implementation thus far. Not only: in the first weekof July, the MKO held a conference of anti-Iran groups, at itsIraqi headquarters in Camp Ashraf.
In addition to covert ops, there has been a good deal oftraditional sabre-rattling, as reported extensively by thiswebsite, among others. Not only did Israel hold massive maneuvreslast month, characterized as preparations for a strike again Iran,but the U.S. and U.K. also held exercises in the Persian Gulf.Iran's much-publicized defensive maneuvres, including the testfiring of medium-range missiles, constituted a logical response,one which could have been expected by anyone who knows how theIranians think.
Most intriguing, and politically decisive, in this picture, is thequestion, what does Moscow, under President Medvedev, think of thisentire complex? There have been a couple of interesting signals inthis respect. First, following the disgusting fiasco of the G-8meeting in Japan, Secretary of State Condi Rice sped off to Pragueto sign an agreement with the Czechs on deployment of the radarsmeant supposedly to track Iranian missiles. The Russian responsehad a new quality. A Foreign Ministry statement issued on July 9,said, "We will be forced to react not with diplomatic, but withmilitary-technical methods." At the same time, there werediscussions between Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad andRussian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Putin called Ahmadinejad onJuly 7to express his "hope that negotiations about nuclear issuewill continue and will yield clear results which would guaranteethe full rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran," PressTV reportedthe next day. ITAR-TASS added that the two had discussed "bilateralcooperation in the field of transport and military-technicalcooperation." The nuclear plant which Russia has completed atBushehr, it has been confirmed, will start operating this year.And, on July 15, RIA Novosti reported that Gazprom and the NationalIranian Oil Company (NIOC) signed a memorandum of cooperation inoil and gas production and transportation. The deal foreseesdevelopment of oil and gas fields, building processing facilities,and transporting oil from the Caspian to the Gulf of Oman. Finally,on July 23, Reuters reported that Iran was to receive "an advancedRussian-made anti-aircraft system by year-end that could help fendoff any preemptive strikes against its nuclear facilities,"according to "senior Israeli defence sources.
Russia is actively opposing the war party's moves to target Iran aswell as the Russian Federation itself. At the same time, Moscow isurging Iran to come to an agreement with the 5+1, and is offeringsubstantial economic and political support in the process. Unlesssomething horrendous occurs in the meantime, it can be expectedthat Iran will announce agreement with the freeze-for-freezeproposal made in Geneva, within the two-week timeframe established.Prof. Hadian-Jazy, a political scientist from the University ofTehran, who publicly detailed Iran's terms for such a freeze optionat a Berlin conference recently, told this author on July 23, thathe also thought Tehran would announce agreement after two weeks.
Those who complain that the Iranians could have said as much inGeneva, without all the fancy footwork, demonstrate their utterlack of understanding of how people in the Islamic Republic think.It has taken almost 30 years for certain forces in the West (eg.current officials in the Bush-Cheney administration) to come toterms with the new reality in the region. Iran's current leadershave not been making outrageous demands. They have insisted onlythat they be treated as equals in any negotiating process, thatthey be respected for their civilization stretching back millenia,that their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence beacknowledged in fact as well as words. Now that this reality seemsto have penetrated some of the less hardened blockheads inWashington, the Iranians may be ready to do business. All to thebenefit of world peace.
1. The White House statement is eloquent in its ambiguity:"improving conditions {should} allow for" this and that, but may infact not; a "general time horizon" is somewhere between now andeternity; "aspirational goals" are presumably things the Iraqigovernment hopes for, but who knows whether they will ever cometrue; "aspirational goals -- such as the resumption of Iraqisecurity control....": "such as" means, "for example," but is notbinding; "the further reduction of U.S. combat forces from Iraq" isa far cry from withdrawal of all troops, which is what the Iraqiswant. In short, the text commits the U.S. to nothing. The Iraqiswill, therefore, not accept this as a solution.