UKRAINE AND THE CONFLICT IN SOUTH OSSETIA

Tag : Hardware Assortment
In the morning of August 10, the Ukrainian Ministry of ForeignAffairs informed its Russian counterpart that in order to preventUkraine from being drawn into an armed conflict, Ukraine might takemeasures to prevent the Russian Black Sea Fleet (RBSF) vessels fromreturning to their base in Sevastopol in the Crimea if they wereinvolved in combat operations against Georgia. This ban might lastuntil the conflict in South Ossetia is regulated, the website ofthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine stated.

Two days earlier, on August 8, the, troop landing ship Yamal leftSevastopol for the Russian port of Novorossiysk, according to areport on the www.proUA.com website which also noted that a largecontingent of ships from the RBSF that had taken part in themilitary exercise Caucasus-2008 in late July did not return toSevastopol but remained in Novorossiysk (www.proUA.com, August 10).

Western media reported that on the night of August 9, Russiantroops had been put ashore from warships into the disputedterritory of Abkhazia.

On August 9 the flagship of the RBSF, the cruiser Moskva, with thecommanding admiral of the fleet, Alexander Kletskov aboard, sailedfrom Sevastopol. It was accompanied by the destroyer Smetlivy andthe anti-submarine ships Muromets and the Aleksandrovets, alongwith an assortment of support vessels.

As the situation on the ground in South Ossetia rapidlydeteriorated, Georgian National Security Council SecretaryAlexander Lomaia told the media that the Russian navy was blockingGeorgian ports and preventing ships laden with grain and fuel fromentering. Meanwhile, Interfax reported that "The navy was orderednot to allow supplies of weapons and military hardware into Georgiaby sea."

On August 10, however, Novosti Press Agency quoted an unnamed,highly placed source in the General Staff of the Russian navy assaying that the role of the RBSF in the conflict was to merelyprovide aid to refugees and strongly denied that Russian shipswere blockading the Georgian coast. A blockade of the coast wouldmean that we were at war with Georgia&which we are not, the sourcewas quoted as saying.

The question of what type of humanitarian role the cruiser Moskva,armed with 16 cruise missiles, torpedoes and an assortment of othersophisticated weaponry, could play was not raised.

Ukraines threat elicited a quick response from the Russian side.Anatoly Nagovitsin, the deputy head of the General Staff of theRussian armed forces, was quoted by UNIAN press agency on August 10as saying that the Ukrainian statement needed reworking, addingthat thus far the RBSF was not engaged in military actions againstGeorgian ships but that this could possibly change along with thesituation.

Later that day, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Gregory Karasintold a press conference in Moscow that the Russian foreign ministrywould begin talks with Ukraine on the return of the RBSF toSevastopol, adding that Russian ships were close to Abkhazterritorial waters in order to prevent a situation similar to theone in South Ossetia from taking place in Abkhazia (UNIAN, August10, 2008).

Russian statements took on more ominous tones later that eveningafter Russian troops began an assault on the Georgian city of Gori.The Ukrayinska Pravda website quoted a spokesman for the RussianForeign Ministry as saying, The actions by the Ukrainian side arecontrary to Ukrainian-Russian agreements and are hostile to theRussian Federation. At approximately the same time, Interfax,citing information released by the Russian navy, reported that aGeorgian military ship had been sunk by the Russian fleet off thecoast of Abkhazia.

The Ukrainian move seems to have come as a nasty surprise for theKremlin and the Russian General Staff, but it is also a risky onefor Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko. Throughout Yushchenkospresidency, Ukraine and Georgia have been exceptionally close. Theyboth applied for a Membership Action Plan in order to join NATO aspart of their pro-Western policies, and both were rejected.Ukrainian arms sales to Georgia have been bitterly criticized byRussia, which claims that the arms were being used by Georgia forethnic cleansing.

As recently as mid-July, Ukrainian, Azeri, Armenian and U.S. troopstook part in a large scale Georgian military exercise, ImmediateResponse 2008, which was planned by the U.S. Armed Forces EuropeanCommand and financed by the U.S. Defense Department.

If the Ukrainian leadership goes through with its threat to closeoff Sevastopol to Russian ships returning from the Georgian coast,a host of problems might arise.

The political situation on the Crimean peninsula, never favorablefor Kyiv, could deteriorate further and increase calls by Russianpoliticians not to renew the 1997 Treaty of Friendship,Cooperation, and Partnership by which Russia recognized the presentborders of Ukraine and which is due to expire in December 2008.

If the treaty expires, the consequences could be severe, since thistreaty, in addition to Nikita Khrushchevs handover of theterritory to Ukraine in 1954, legalized Ukrainian claims to theCrimea. This could pave the way for renewed calls by Russianpoliticians and military leaders to annex the peninsula.

Another problem that is sure to become aggravated is the continuingdispute between Kyiv and Moscow over the Russian lease of the RBSFbase in Sevastopol, which is due to expire in 2017. Ukraine doesnot want to extend the lease, and the Russians insist that it beprolonged.

But the main question worrying the West and the Ukrainianleadership is that an emboldened nationalistic Russia might decideto come to the rescue of the predominantly Russian population inthe Crimea just as it came to the rescue of the South Ossetiansand Abkhaz.

Such a scenario could conceivably force Kyiv to defend itsterritorial integrity and declare war on Russia, which would haveenormous repercussions around the world.