India blows up a monsoon

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India blows up a monsoon
By M K Bhadrakumar

It cuts both ways when an unelected politician heads the governmentin a democratic country. On the one hand, he may not be adept atthe politicking that becomes essential, especially when he leads acoalition government. But on the other hand, unlike a grassrootspolitician, he can act with decisiveness and foresight in so far ashe can be impervious to public opinion.

Seventy-six-year-old Manmohan Singh, who heads India's coalitiongovernment, has never won a direct election in his two-decade-oldpublic life. India provides for indirectly elected politicians tohead the federal government and Manmohan took recourse to thatprovision. This had never happened before as his



predecessors invariably sought direct election, which they saw astheir mandate to rule.

Arguably, Manmohan is turning conventional wisdom on its head. NoIndian grassroots politician in his shoes today would so decisivelypress ahead with the India-United States civilian nuclearcooperation agreement - popularly known among Indians as the"deal".

It is patently clear that the nuclear deal is not an issue on whichthe May 2009 parliamentary elections can be won by the rulingCongress party to which Manmohan belongs. And in pushing the deal,he has shown panache for politicking that borders on adventurism bythe rule book of any Indian grassroots politician. Is Manmohanoverreaching? Acolytes applaud him for "political courage".

Yet, Manmohan's determination to press ahead with the deal and haveit formalized during the limited time ahead while US PresidentGeorge W Bush is in office is not a matter of whimsicality. For onething, the Congress leadership is backing him. He is personallyconvinced of the imperative of transforming India's foreign policyand of making the country a strategic partner of the US, and, moreimportant, ensuring that the transformation becomes irreversible.

Manmohan does believe in the raison d'etre of strategic partnershipwith the US for India's rise as a major power. In his mind, hispersonal belief and the country's interests seem to happilycoalesce at this point in India's contemporary history.

The nuclear deal in the final stages The general impression is that time has run out for finalizing thedeal during Bush's - whom Manmohan described as the "friendliest USpresident" - term in office. But Manmohan estimates the deal isstill doable. He is probably right. Manmohan hopes to formalize thesafeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA), which is a necessary underpinning for the deal, bymid-July.

He may set the ball rolling by personally apprising Bush of hisgame-plan when they meet on the sidelines of the Group of Eightmeeting in Japan next week. The IAEA's formal ratification of thesafeguards agreement would be forthcoming latest by the end ofAugust. The next step - obtaining a "waiver" from the NuclearSuppliers Group (NSG) - is expected to take about a month and looksa smooth run, thanks to the NSG being a progeny of the US globalstrategy and given Bush's personal interest in the deal.

That, in turn, enables Bush to send to the US Congress the Indo-UScooperation agreement - 123 Agreement - for final approval byend-October or early November at the very latest. Given stronglobbying by high-flying US corporate groups that expectmulti-billion dollar business opportunities and rallying bypowerful Jewish groups which root for US-India (and Israel-India)strategic ties, and thanks to assured bipartisan support on CapitolHill, the chances are good that the deal will be home and drybefore Bush demits office.

The Bush-Manmohan axis will be in full gear between now and Januaryin propelling the deal. The deal is already touted as a rareforeign policy success of the Bush era. Manmohan sprung a surpriselast month by pressing the pedal when the deal was taken to be deadas a dodo for want of support in the Indian parliament.

But he had never quite given up on the deal. He was active in thesub-soil in his own dogged way. The political establishmentresorted to clever stratagems - dissimulation, maneuvering andback-room dealings - to shepherd public opinion and virtuallyisolate opponents of the deal so as to eventually marginalize theirreconcilable elements. The Congress party is enormouslyexperienced in government and its skill in political management islegion in India.

At any rate, Manmohan demonstrated he could give a run for themoney to India's tough politicians, while few expected the formeracademic-turned-economist and World Bank official to have killerinstincts. The Congress also has a strategy to counter those whothought the deal would alienate India's 130 million-strong Muslimpopulation and that, in turn, would cost the party dear in the 2009elections.

Indian Muslims and the deal
True, Muslim votes are scattered over tens of dozens ofparliamentary constituencies and can be decisive. Conceivably,Indian Muslims view the nuclear deal through the prism of Bush'simage as a crusader against Islam. But the government has taken inhand a conscious effort to project that Muslim countries regardIndia as an important partner and that the deal doesn't jeopardizeIndia's standing. The Congress spokespersons have been at pains tounderline no one should "communalize" the deal - coded expressionto the effect that other political parties shouldn't exploit theMuslim outrage over the Manmohan government cozying up to the Bushadministration.

Indian diplomacy is in full cry, wooing the Muslim world. The focushas shifted from "Euro-Atlanticism" to the Middle East. IndianForeign Minister Pranab Mukherjee is currently visiting Egypt,having been to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates inApril. India hosted a five-day visit by Syrian President Basharal-Assad in May. Manmohan is due to visit Saudi Arabia.

The icing on the cake will be Manmohan's high-profile visit toPakistan, which will have great resonance in Indian Muslim opinion.There is talk of an outside chance that some sort of broadunderstanding may be reached with Pakistan over Kashmir and even aCamp David-like peace process might become possible with Bush'sblessing (think Nobel Peace Prizes, etc). Any such development willimmensely boost the Congress party's popularity in India.

Meanwhile, India's National Security Advisor M K Narayanan visitedTehran on Tuesday as the prime minister's special envoy. Mukherjeeis expected to visit Tehran at the end of July, his second visit inrecent months. There is a standing invitation to Manmohan to visitIran, which is under discussion. The government is conscious thatrelations with Iran have become the litmus test of India'sindependent foreign policy in Muslim perceptions. India has theworld's second-largest Shi'ite population, but that apart, theIranian revolution of 1979 caught the imagination of Indian Muslimsand there is much outrage among them over the US's standoff withIran. Under US (and Israeli) pressure, India was forced to mothballits ties with Iran in the recent years. Muslim opinion in India wasappalled.

US watchful of India-Iran ties
The government estimates that critics could be silenced if it cameout as keeping friendly relations alike with the US, Israel andIran. For this to happen, Tehran must cooperate. Indian diplomacykeeps underscoring to Tehran that India is raring to go forwardwith "strategic" cooperation with Iran. On a parallel track, Delhiis constantly nudging Washington and Jerusalem towards an awakeningthat the Manmohan government has been carefully delimiting theparameters of its strategic cooperation with Tehran in sensitiveareas and, therefore, there is no need of arm-twisting publicly.

It is a delicate balancing act, but India's high-caliber diplomatscan cope with it. Delhi hopes Washington will realize its brazenpressure tactic hardly takes note of Manmohan's domesticcompulsions. Delhi sizes up that the US engagement of Iran is now amatter of time. On his arrival in Tehran on Monday, Narayanan toldthe media India would be willing to mediate between Iran and theinternational community. Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad andMajlis (parliament) speaker Ali Larijani received him.

Somehow, the nuclear deal and the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipelineproject have become intertwined. Recently, the chairman of thesub-committee on the Middle East and South Asia in the US House ofRepresentatives, Congressman Gary Ackerman, warned he was having a"very difficult time understanding why the government of Indiacontinues to pursue a pipeline with Iran and Pakistan".

Top Indian officials fail to respond to such intrusive remarks, butkeep articulating interest in the pipeline. This may appear"strategic defiance" of Washington and has political mileage inIndian public opinion. But in actuality, a lot of grandstanding isgoing on. Since the pipeline project involves Iran and Pakistan,Muslim opinion is exercised. Therefore, no matter the actualdynamics of the project (which is at a snail's pace), thegovernment needs to be vocal. In any case, the project will takeseveral years to materialize, and by that time the regionalsituation (Iran-US standoff and Iran-Israel hostilities) can beexpected to have dramatically changed.

The US estimates that actualizing the India-US nuclear deal itselfwill take care of a host of problem areas, such as India-Iranianrelations. Equally, Israel has shown equanimity by not publiclyobjecting to Delhi's dealings with Tehran.

Stephen Cohen, South Asia expert at the Brookings Institution inthe US, pointed out at a US Congressional hearing recently, "Japan,Turkey, Italy, Germany and South Korea are among Iran's largesttrade partners in 2007. France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan andTurkey - again US allies - were among the largest investors in Iranin 2006. India lags considerably behind all of these countries interms of its economic relationship with Iran."

Cohen concluded, "We [US] should not demand Indian support for allour Iranian policies any more than we should allow India to dictateour policy towards Pakistan." He may have overstated India's case,but at the same congressional hearing, former assistant secretaryof state for South Asia, ambassador Teresita C Schaffer, also madea forceful case that "experience of the last 10 years would suggestthat the 'partnership list' will grow with time" and the nucleardeal would be the "most powerful tool" in this process.

Political uncertainties lie ahead
Against this backdrop, Manmohan decided that his minoritygovernment would be better off without the support of the Indiancommunist parties who robustly oppose the nuclear deal and India'sstrategic ties with the US and Israel. He worked according to aplan. The Congress drew the communists into a consultativemechanism over the past year, which ostensibly was aimed atbuilding a consensus, but incrementally deprived the left of theneed to resort to public criticism.

Once public criticism eased, the establishment began saturatingIndian media and discourses with its point of view. The Indiandiscourses rapidly became one-sided. Meanwhile, Congress beganwooing an important regional party, the Samajwadi Party, in lieu ofsupport from the communists, to ensure the government remains inpower.

There is an element of risk in the project. The communists weresteady allies through the past four-and-a-half year period of theminority government, whereas Samajwadi Party has a shifty record.But it suffices for the Congress that Samajwadi is open to wheelingand dealing, is averse to mid-term polls, and is a stakeholdersince being a key supporter of the ruling alliance in Delhienhances its clout in the northern provinces, which are its powerbase and where it has local scores to settle. All the same, thereis an inherent uncertainty in such an opportunistic patchwork.

Besides, when the crunch time comes, it is the government'seconomic legacy - and not the nuclear deal - that will be the focalpoint in the 2009 elections. Ironically, Manmohan, an economist,stands on shaky ground. But with some luck, double-digit inflation,which is an incendiary issue, will ease if prices come downfollowing a good autumn crop, provided, of course, monsoon rains donot fail, which will largely depend on whether or not the La Ninaphenomenon in the central Pacific Ocean - unusual cooling ofsurface waters - has exhausted itself or not. But, more critically,if an El Nino phenomenon is going to develop in its place thatcould potentially have an adverse impact on the monsoons. The WorldMeteorological Organization counsels, "There is need for carefulmonitoring over the coming weeks."

The Manmohan government might seem impervious, but a grassrootsIndian politician would say there are too many "ifs" and "buts" forcomfort.

M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for over29 years, with postings including India's ambassador to Uzbekistan(1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001).

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